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Frugal Mechanism Design via Spectral Techniques
Ning Chen∗ Edith Elkind∗ Nick Gravin∗† Fedor Petrov†
Abstract
We study the design of truthful mechanisms for set systems, i.e., scenarios where a customer needs
to hire a team of agents to perform a complex task. In this setting, frugality [2] provides a measure
to evaluate the “cost of truthfulness”, that is, the overpayment of a truthful mechanism relative to
the “fair” payment.
We propose a uniform scheme for designing frugal truthful mechanisms for general set systems.
Our scheme is based on scaling the agents’ bids using the eigenvector of a matrix that encodes the
interdependencies between the agents. We demonstrate that the r-out-of-k-system mechanism and
the
√
-mechanism for buying a path in a graph [21] can be viewed as instantiations of our scheme. We
then apply our scheme to two other classes of set systems, namely, vertex cover systems [6, 10] and
k-path systems, in which a customer needs to purchase k edge-disjoint source-sink paths. For both
settings, we bound the frugality of our mechanism in terms of the largest eigenvalue of the respective
interdependency matrix.
We show that our mechanism is optimal for a large subclass of vertex cover systems satisfying a
simple local sparsity condition. For k-path systems, while our mechanism is within a factor of k + 1
from optimal, we show that it is, in fact, optimal, when one uses a modified definition of frugality
proposed in [10]. Our lower bound argument combines spectral techniques and Young’s inequality,
and is applicable to all set systems. As both r-out-of-k systems and single path systems can be viewed
as special cases of k-path systems, our result improves the lower bounds of [21] and answers several
open questions proposed in [21].
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1 Introduction
Consider a scenario where a customer wishes to purchase the rights to have data routed on his behalf
from a source s to a destination t in a network where each edge is owned by a selfishly motivated
agent. Each agent incurs a privately known cost if the data is routed through his edge, and wants to be
compensated for this cost, and, if possible, make a profit. The customer needs to decide which edges to
buy, and wants to minimize his total expense.
This problem is a special case of the hiring-a-team problem [27, 21, 20, 5, 10]: Given a set of agents
E , a customer wishes to hire a team of agents capable of performing a certain complex task on his behalf.
A subset S ⊆ E is said to be feasible if the agents in S can jointly perform the complex task. This
scenario can be described by a set system (E ,F), where E is the set of agents and F is the collection
of feasible sets. Each agent e ∈ E can perform a simple task at a privately known cost c(e). In such
environments, a natural way to make the hiring decisions is by means of mechanisms — Each agent e
submits a bid b(e), i.e., the payment that he wants to receive, and based on these bids the customer
selects a feasible set S ∈ F (the set of winners), and determines the payment to each agent in S.
A desirable property of mechanisms is that of truthfulness: It should be in the best interest of every
agent e to bid his true cost, i.e. to set b(e) = c(e) no matter what bids other agents submit; that is,
truth-telling should be a dominant strategy for every agent. Truthfulness is a strong and very appealing
concept: it obviates the need for agents to perform complex strategic computations, even if they do
not know the costs and strategies of others. This property is especially important in the Internet and
electronic commerce settings, as most protocols are executed instantly.
One of the most celebrated truthful designs is the VCG mechanism [28, 7, 18], where the feasible set
with the smallest total bid wins, and the payment to each agent e in the winning set is his threshold bid,
i.e., the highest value that e could have bid to still be part of a winning set. While VCG mechanism is
truthful, on the negative side, it can make the customer pay far more than the true cost of the winning
set, or even the cheapest alternative, as illustrated by the following example: There are two parallel
paths P1 and P2 from s to t, P1 has one edge with cost 1 and P2 has n edges with cost 0 each. VCG
selects P2 as the winning path and pays 1 to every edge in P2. Hence, the total payment of VCG is n,
the number of edges in P2, which is far more than the total cost of both P1 and P2.
The VCG overpayment property illustrated above is clearly undesirable from the customer’s perspec-
tive, and thus motivates the search for truthful mechanisms that are frugal, i.e., select a feasible set and
induce truthful cost revelation without resulting in high overpayment. However, formalizing the notion of
frugality is a challenging problem, as it is not immediately clear what the payment of a mechanism should
be compared to. A natural candidate for this benchmark is the total cost of the closest competitor, i.e.,
the cost of the cheapest feasible set among those that are disjoint from the winning set. This definition
coincides with the second highest bid in single-item auctions and has been used in, e.g., [1, 2, 27, 11].
However, as observed by Karlin, Kempe and Tamir [21], such feasible set may not exist at all, even in
monopoly-free set systems (i.e., set systems where no agent appears in all feasible sets). To deal with this
problem, [21] proposed an alternative benchmark, which is bounded for any monopoly-free set system
and is closely related to the buyer-optimal Nash equilibrium of first-price auctions (see Definition 2.2).
Nash equilibrium corresponds to a stable outcome of the bargaining process, and therefore provides a
natural lower bound on the total payment of any dominant strategy mechanism. Throughout the paper,
we use the benchmark of [21], as well as its somewhat more relaxed variant suggested in [10] to study
frugality of truthful mechanisms.
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1.1 Our Results
Uniform Frugal Truthful Mechanisms. We propose a uniform scheme, which we call Pruning-
Lifting Mechanism, to design frugal truthful mechanisms for set systems. At a high-level view, this
mechanism consists of two key steps: pruning and lifting.
• Pruning. In a general set system, the relationships among the agents can be arbitrarily complicated.
Thus, in the pruning step, we remove agents from the system so as to expose the structure of the
competition. Intuitively, the goal is to keep only the agents who are going to play a role in
determining the bids in Nash equilibrium; this enables us to compare the payoffs of our mechanism
to the total equilibrium payment. Since we decide which agents to prune based on their bids, we
have to make our choices carefully so as to preserve truthfulness.
• Lifting. The goal of the lifting process is to “lift” the bid of each remaining agent so as to take into
account the size of each feasible set. For this purpose, we use a graph-theoretic approach inspired
by the ideas in [21]. Namely, we construct a graph H whose vertices are agents, and there is an edge
between two agents e and e′ if removing both e and e′ results in a system with no feasible solution.
We call H the dependency graph of the pruned system. We then compute the largest eigenvalue of
H (or, more precisely, the maximum of the largest eigenvalues of its connected components), which
we denote by αH, and scale the bid of each agent by the respective coordinate of the eigenvector
that corresponds to αH.
A given set system may be pruned in different ways, thus leading to different values of αH. We will refer
to the largest of them, i.e., α = supH αH, as the eigenvalue of our set system. It turns out that this
quantity plays an important role in our analysis.
We show that the r-out-of-k-system mechanism and the
√
-mechanism for the single path problem
that were presented in [21] can be viewed as instantiations of our Pruning-Lifting Mechanism. We
then apply our scheme to two other classes of set systems: vertex cover systems, where the goal is to
buy a vertex cover in a given graph, and k-path systems, where the goal is to buy k edge-disjoint paths
between two vertices of a given graph.
The k-path problem generalizes both the r-out-of-k problem and the single path problem, and cap-
tures many other natural scenarios. However, this problem received limited attention from the algorith-
mic mechanism design community so far (see, however, [19]), perhaps due to its inherent difficulty: the
interactions among the agents can be quite complex, and, prior to this work, it was not known how to
characterize Nash equilibria of the first-price auctions for this setting in terms of the network structure.
In this paper, we obtain a strong lower bound on the total payments in Nash equilibria. We then use
this bound to show that a natural variant of the Pruning-Lifting Mechanism that prunes all edges
except those in the cheapest flow of size k + 1 has frugality ratio αk+1k . Moreover, we show that this
bound can be improved by a factor of k + 1 if we consider a weaker payment bound suggested in [10],
which corresponds to a buyer-pessimal rather than buyer-optimal Nash equilibrium (i.e., the difference
between two frugality bounds is akin to that between the price of anarchy and the price of stability).
For the vertex cover problem, an earlier paper [10] described a mechanism with frugality ratio 2∆,
where ∆ is the maximum degree of the input graph. Our approach results in a mechanism whose
frugality ratio equals to the largest eigenvalue α of the adjacency matrix of the input graph. As α ≤ ∆
for any graph G, this means that we improve the result of [10] by at least a factor of 2 for all graphs.
Surprisingly, this stronger bound can be obtained by a simple modification of the analysis in [10].
Lower Bounds. We complement the bounds on the frugality of the Pruning-Lifting Mechanism
by proving strong lower bounds on the frugality of (almost) any truthful mechanism. In more detail,
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we exhibit a family of cost vectors on which the payment of any measurable truthful mechanism can be
lower-bounded in terms of α, where we call a mechanism measurable if the payment to any agent —
as a function of other agents’ bids — is a Lebesgue measurable function. Lebesgue measurability is a
much weaker condition than continuity or monotonicity; indeed, a mechanism that does not satisfy this
condition is unlikely to be practically implementable! Our argument relies on Young’s inequality and
applies to any set system.
To turn this lower bound on payments into a lower bound on frugality, we need to understand the
structure of Nash equilibria for the bid vectors employed in our proof. For k-path systems, we can
achieve this by using our characterization of Nash equilibria in such systems. As a result, we obtain
a lower bound on frugality of any “measurable” truthful mechanism that shows that our mechanism is
within a factor of (k + 1) from optimal. Moreover, it is, in fact, optimal, with respect to the weaker
payment bound of [10]. For r-out-of-k systems and single path systems, our bound improves the lower
bounds on frugality given in [21] by a factor of 2 and
√
2, respectively. Our results give strong evidence
that simply choosing the cheapest (k + 1)-flow mechanism, which generalizes the
√
-mechanism [21] for
k = 1, is indeed an optimal frugal mechanism for paths systems.
For the vertex cover problem, characterizing the Nash equilibria turns out to be a more difficult
task: in this case, the graph H is equal to the input graph, and therefore is not guaranteed to have
any regularity properties. However, we can still obtain non-trivial upper bounds on the payments in
Nash equilibria. These bounds enable us to show that our mechanism for vertex cover is optimal for all
triangle-free graphs, and, more generally, for all graphs that satisfy a simple local sparsity condition.
1.2 Related Work
There is a substantial literature on designing mechanisms with small payment for shortest path sys-
tems [2, 11, 12, 8, 9, 19, 29] as well as for other set systems [27, 6, 4, 21, 10], starting with the seminal
work of Nisan and Ronen [26]. Our work is most closely related to [21], [10] and [29]: we employ the
frugality benchmark defined in [21], improve the bounds of [21] and [10], and generalize the result of [29].
Simultaneously and independently, the idea of bounding frugality ratios of set system auctions in
terms of eigenvalues of certain matrices was proposed by Kempe et al. [23]. In contrast with our work,
in [23] the authors only study the frugality ratio of their mechanisms with respect to the relaxed payment
bound (see Section 5). Their approach results in a 2-competitive mechanism for vertex cover systems,
2(k+1)-competitive mechanism for k-path systems, and a 4-competitive mechanism for cut auctions.
2 Preliminaries
A set system (E ,F) is given by a set E of agents and a collection F ⊆ 2E of feasible sets. We restrict our
attention to monopoly-free set systems, i.e., we require
⋂
S∈F S = ∅. Each agent e ∈ E has a privately
known cost c(e) that represents the expenses that agent e incurs if he is involved in performing the task.
A mechanism for a set system (E ,F) takes a bid vector b = (b(e))e∈E as input, where b(e) ≥ c(e)
for any e ∈ E , and outputs a set of winners S ∈ F and a payment p(e) for each e ∈ E . We require
mechanisms to satisfy voluntary participation, i.e. p(e) ≥ b(e) for each e ∈ S and p(e) = 0 for each e /∈ S.
Given the output of a mechanism, the utility of an agent e is p(e) − c(e) if e is a winner and 0
otherwise. We assume that agents are rational, i.e. aim to maximize their own utility. Thus, they may
lie about their true costs, i.e. bid b(e) 6= c(e) if they can profit by doing so. We say that a mechanism is
truthful if every agent maximizes his utility by bidding his true value, no matter what bids other agents
submit. A weaker solution concept is that of Nash equilibrium: a bid vector constitutes a (pure) Nash
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equilibrium if no agent can increase his utility by unilaterally changing his bid. Nash equilibria describe
stable states of the market and can be seen as natural outcomes of a bargaining process.
There is a well-known characterization of winner selection rules that yield truthful mechanisms.
Theorem 2.1 ([24, 2]). A mechanism is truthful if and only if its winner selection rule is monotone,
i.e., no losing agent can become a winner by increasing his bid, given the fixed bids of all other agents.
Further, for a given monotone selection rule, there is a unique truthful mechanism with this selection
rule: the payment to each winner is his threshold bid, i.e. the highest value he could bid and still win.
An example of a truthful set system auction is given by the VCG mechanism [28, 7, 18]. However, as
discussed in Section 1, VCG often results in a large overpayment to winners. Another natural mechanism
for buying a set is the first-price auction: given the bid vector b, pick a subset S ∈ F minimizing b(S),
and pay each winner e ∈ S his bid b(e). While the first-price auction is not truthful, and more generally,
does not possess dominant strategies, it essentially admits a Nash equilibrium with a relatively small
total payment. (More accurately, as observed by [19], a first-price auction may not have a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium. However, this non-existence result can be circumvented in several ways, e.g. by
considering instead an ε-Nash equilibrium for arbitrarily small ε > 0 or using oracle access to the true
costs of agents to break ties.) The payment in a buyer-optimal Nash equilibrium would constitute a
natural benchmark for truthful mechanisms. However, due to the difficulties described above, we use
instead the following benchmark proposed by Karlin et al. [21], which captures the main properties of a
Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2.2 (Benchmark ν(c) [21]). Given a set system (E ,F), and a feasible set S ∈ F of minimum
total cost w.r.t. c, let ν(c) be the value of an optimal solution to the following optimization problem:
min
∑
e∈S
b(e)
s.t. (1) b(e) ≥ c(e) for all e ∈ E
(2)
∑
e∈S\T
b(e) ≤
∑
e∈T\S
c(e) for all T ∈ F
(3) For every e ∈ S there is a T ∈ F s.t. e /∈ T and
∑
e′∈S\T
b(e′) =
∑
e′∈T\S
c(e′)
Intuitively, in the optimal solution of the above system, S is the set of winners in the first-price
auction. By condition (3), no winner e ∈ S can improve his utility by increasing his bid b(e), as he
would not be a winner anymore. In addition, by conditions (1) and (2), no agent e ∈ E \ S can obtain
a positive utility by decreasing his bid. Hence, ν(c) gives the value of the cheapest Nash equilibrium of
the first-price auction assuming that the most “efficient” feasible set S wins.
Definition 2.3 (Frugality Ratio). LetM be a truthful mechanism for the set system (E ,F) and let p
M
(c)
denote the total payment of M when the true costs are given by a vector c. Then the frugality ratio of
M on c is defined as φM(c) = pM(c)ν(c) . Further, the frugality ratio of M is defined as φM = supc φM(c).
3 Pruning-Lifting Mechanism
In this section, we describe a general scheme for designing truthful mechanisms for set systems, which
we call Pruning-Lifting Mechanism. For a given set system (E ,F), the mechanism is composed of
the following steps:
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• Pruning. The goal of the pruning process is to drop some elements of E to expose the structure of
the competition between the agents; we denote the set of surviving agents by E∗. We require the
process to satisfy the following properties:
– Monotonicity: for any given vector of other agents’ bids, if an agent e is dropped when he bids
b, he is also dropped if he bids any b′ > b. We set t1(e) = inf{b′ | e is dropped when bidding b′}.
– Bid-independence: for any given vector of other agents’ bids, let b and b′ be two bids of agent
e such that e is not dropped when he submits either of them. Then for both of these bids the
set E∗ of remaining agents is the same. That is, e cannot control the outcome of the pruning
process as long as he survives. Monotonicity and bid-independence conditions are important
to ensure the truthfulness of the mechanism.
– Monopoly-freeness: the remaining set system must remain monopoly-free, i.e.,
⋂
S∈F∗ S = ∅,
where F∗ = {S′ ∈ F | S′ ⊆ E∗}. This condition is necessary because in the winner selection
stage we will choose a winning feasible set from F∗. Therefore, we have to make sure that no
winning agent can charge an arbitrarily high price due to lack of competition.
• Lifting. The goal of the lifting process is to assign a weight to each agent in E∗ in order to take
into account the size of each feasible set. To this end, construct an undirected graph H by (a)
introducing a node ve for each e ∈ E∗, and (b) connecting ve and ve′ if and only if any feasible
set in F∗ contains either e or e′. We will refer to H as the dependency graph of E∗. For each
connected component Hj of H, compute the largest eigenvalue αj of its adjacency matrix Aj ,
and let (w(ve))ve∈Hj be the eigenvector of Aj associated with αj . That is, Ajw
j = αjw
j, where
wj =
(
(w(ve))ve∈Hj
)T
. Set α = maxαj .
• Winner selection. Define b′(e) = b(e)w(ve) for each e ∈ E∗, and select a feasible set S ∈ F∗ with the
smallest total bids w.r.t. b′. Let t2(e) be the threshold bid for e ∈ E∗ to be selected at this stage.
• Payment. The payment to each winner e ∈ S is p(e) = min{t1(e), t2(e)}, where t1(e) and t2(e) are
the two thresholds defined above.
Recall that the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix of a connected graph is positive and its
associated eigenvector has strictly positive coordinates [15]. Therefore, w(ve) > 0 for all e ∈ E∗.
We will now define a quantity α(E,F) that will be instrumental in characterizing the frugality ratio of
truthful mechanisms on (E ,F). Let S(E ,F) be the collection of all monopoly-free subsets of E , i.e., set
S(E ,F) = {S ⊆ E | ⋂T∈F ,T⊆S T = ∅}. The elements of S(E ,F) are the possible outcomes of the pruning
stage. For any subset S ∈ S(E ,F), let HS be its dependency graph and AS be the adjacency matrix of
HS. Let αS be the largest eigenvalue of AS (or the maximum of the largest eigenvalues of the adjacency
matrices of the connected components of HS, if HS is not connected). Set α(E,F) = maxS∈S(E,F) αS ; we
will refer to α(E,F) as the eigenvalue of the set system (E ,F).
Note that once E∗ ∈ S(E ,F) is selected in the pruning step, the computation of α and the weight
vector (w(ve))e∈E∗ does not depend on the bid vector. This property is crucial for showing that our
mechanism is truthful. (Due to space limits, most proofs in the paper are relegated to the Appendix.)
Theorem 3.1. Pruning-Lifting Mechanism is truthful for any set system (E ,F).
In the rest of this section, we will show that the mechanisms for r-out-of-k systems and single path
systems proposed in [21] can be viewed as instantiations of our Pruning-Lifting Mechanism. By
Theorems 2.1 and 3.1, we can ignore the payment rule in the following discussion.
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3.1 r-out-of-k Systems Revisited
In an r-out-of-k system, the set of agents E is a union of k disjoint subsets S1, . . . , Sk and the feasible
sets are unions of exactly r of those subsets. Given a bid vector b, renumber the subsets S1, . . . , Sk in
order of non-decreasing bids, i.e., b(S1) ≤ b(S2) ≤ · · · ≤ b(Sk).
The mechanism proposed in [21] deletes all but the first r + 1 subsets, and then solves a system of
equations given by
(♦) β =
1
rxi
·
∑
j 6=i
xj · |Sj| for i = 1, . . . , r + 1.
It then scales the bid of each set Si by setting b
′(Si) =
b(Si)
xi
, discards the set with the highest scaled bid
w.r.t. b′, and outputs the remaining sets.
Now, clearly, the first step of this mechanism can be interpreted as a pruning stage. Further, for
r-out-of-k systems the graph H constructed in the lifting stage of our mechanism is a complete (r + 1)-
partite graph. It is not hard to verify that for any positive solution (x1, . . . , xr+1, β) of the system (♦),
β · r gives the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix of H and (x1, . . . , x1, . . . , xr+1, . . . , xr+1) is the
corresponding eigenvector. Thus, the mechanism of [21] implements Pruning-Lifting Mechanism for
r-out-of-k systems.
In [21] it is shown that the frugality ratio of this mechanism is β, and that the frugality ratio of any
truthful mechanism for r-out-of-k systems is at least β2 . As r-out-of-k systems can be viewed as a special
case of r-path systems, Theorem 6.5 allows us to improve this lower bound to βrr = β.
3.2 Single Path Mechanisms Revisited
In a single path system, agents are edges of a given directed graph G = (V,E) with two specified vertices
s and t, i.e. E = E and F consists of all sets of edges that contain a path from s to t.
Given a bid vector b, the
√
-mechanism [21] first selects two edge-disjoint s-t paths P and P ′ that
minimize b(P )+ b(P ′). Assume that P and P ′ intersect at s = v1, v2, . . . , vℓ+1 = t, in the order in which
they appear in P and P ′. Let Pi and P ′i be the subpaths of P and P
′ from vi to vi+1, respectively. The√
-mechanism sets b′(e) = b(e)
√|Pi| for e ∈ Pi, b′(e) = b(e)√|P ′i | for e ∈ P ′i , and chooses a cheapest
path in P ∪ P ′ w.r.t. b′.
As in the previous case, the selection of P and P ′ can be viewed as the pruning process. The
corresponding graph H consists of ℓ connected components, where the i-th component Hi is a complete
bipartite graph with parts of size |Pi| and |P ′i |. Its largest eigenvalue is given by αi =
√|Pi||P ′i |,
and the coordinates of the corresponding eigenvector are given by w(ve) = 1/
√|Pi| for e ∈ Pi and
w(ve) = 1/
√|P ′i | for e ∈ P ′i . Thus, the √ -mechanism can be viewed as a special case of the Pruning-
Lifting Mechanism. It is shown that the frugality ratio of the
√
-mechanism is within a factor of 2
√
2
from optimal; Theorem 6.5 below shows that this bound can be improved by a factor of
√
2 (this has
also been shown by Yan [29] via a proof that is considerably more complicated than ours).
4 Vertex Cover Systems
In the vertex cover problem, we are given a graph G = (V,E) whose vertices are owned by selfish agents.
Our goal is to purchase a vertex cover of G. That is, we have E = V , and F is the collection of all vertex
covers of G. Let A denote the adjacency matrix of G, and let ∆, α = α(E,F) and w = (w(v))v∈V denote,
respectively, the maximum degree of G, the largest eigenvalue of A and the corresponding eigenvector.
6
We will use the pruning-lifting scheme to construct a mechanism whose frugality ratio is α; this
improves the bound of 2∆ given in [10] by at least a factor of 2 for all graphs, and by as much as a factor
of Θ(
√
n) for some graphs (e.g., the star).
Observe first that the vertex cover system plays a special role in the analysis of the performance of
the pruning-lifting scheme. Indeed, on one hand, it is straightforward to apply the Pruning-Lifting
Mechanism to this system: since removing any agent will make each of its neighbors a monopolist, the
pruning stage of our scheme is redundant, i.e., H = G. That is, there is a unique implementation of
Pruning-Lifting Mechanism for vertex cover systems: we set b′(v) = b(v)w(v) for all v ∈ V , pick any
S ∈ argmin{b′(T ) | T is a vertex cover for G} to be the winning set, and pay each agent v ∈ S his
threshold bid t(v). On the other hand, for general set systems, any feasible set in the pruned system
corresponds to a vertex cover of H: indeed, by construction of the graph H, any feasible set must
contain at least one endpoint of any edge of H. In general, the converse is not true: a vertex cover of H
is not necessarily a feasible set. However, for k-path systems it is possible to show that any cover of H
corresponds to a k-flow. We can use this fact to provide an alternative proof of Theorems 5.1 and 5.6.
We will now bound the frugality of Pruning-Lifting Mechanism for vertex cover systems.
Theorem 4.1. The frugality ratio of Pruning-Lifting Mechanism for vertex cover systems on a
graph G is at most α = α(E,F).
Proof. Since our mechanism is truthful, we have b(v) = c(v) for all v ∈ V . By optimality of S we
have b′(v) ≤∑uv∈E,u 6∈S b′(u), and therefore t(v) ≤ w(v)∑uv∈E,u 6∈S c(u)w(u) . Thus, we can bound the total
payment of our mechanism given a bid vector b as
∑
v∈S
t(v) ≤
∑
v∈S
w(v)
∑
uv∈E,u 6∈S
c(u)
w(u)
=
∑
u/∈S
c(u)
w(u)
∑
uv∈E
w(v) =
∑
u/∈S
c(u)
w(u)
αw(u) = α
∑
u/∈S
c(u).
Lemma 8 in [10] shows that for any cost vector c we have ν(c) ≥ ∑u/∈S c(u). Therefore, the frugality
ratio of Pruning-Lifting Mechanism for vertex cover on G is at most α.
In Section 6.1 we show that our mechanism is optimal for a large class of graphs.
4.1 Computational Issues
To implement Pruning-Lifting Mechanism for vertex cover, we need to select the vertex cover that
minimizes the scaled costs given by (b′(v))v∈V , i.e., to solve an NP-hard problem. However, the argument
in Theorem 4.1 applies to any truthful mechanism that selects a locally optimal solution, i.e., a vertex
cover S that satisfies b′(v) ≤∑uv∈E,u 6∈S b′(u) for all v ∈ S. Paper [10] argues that any monotone winner
selection algorithm for vertex cover can be transformed into a locally optimal one, and shows that a
variant of the classic 2-approximation algorithm for this problem [3] is monotone. This leads to the
following corollary.
Corollary 4.2. There exists a truthful polynomial-time vertex cover auction that given a graph G outputs
a solution whose cost is within a factor of 2 from optimal and whose frugality ratio is at most α.
5 Multiple Paths Systems
In this section, we study in detail k-paths systems for a given integer k ≥ 1. In these systems, the set
of agents E is the set of edges of a directed graph G = (V,E) with two specified vertices s, t ∈ V . The
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feasible sets are sets of edges that contain k edge-disjoint s-t paths. Clearly, these set systems generalize
both r-out-of-k systems and single path systems.
Our mechanism for k-paths systems for a given directed graph G, which we call Pruning-Lifting
k-Paths Mechanism, is a natural generalization of the
√
-mechanism [21]: In the pruning stage of our
mechanism, given a bid vector b, we pick k+1 edge-disjoint s-t paths P1, . . . , Pk+1 so as to minimize their
total bid w.r.t. the bid vector b. Clearly, this procedure is monotone and bid-independent. Let G∗(b)
denote the subgraph composed of these k + 1 paths. The remaining steps of the mechanism (lifting,
winner selection, payment determination) are the same as in the general case (Section 3). Since the
Pruning-Lifting k-Paths Mechanism is an implementation of the Pruning-Lifting Mechanism,
Theorem 3.1 implies that it is truthful.
Let Gk+1 denote the set of all subgraphs of G that can be represented as a union of k + 1 edge-
disjoint s-t paths in G. For any G∗ ∈ Gk+1, let H(G∗) denote the dependency graph of G∗, and let
α(G∗) denote the maximum of the largest eigenvalues of the connected components of H(G∗). Set
αk+1 = max{α(G∗) | G∗ ∈ Gk+1}. We can bound the frugality ratio of our mechanism as follows.
Theorem 5.1. The frugality ratio of Pruning-Lifting k-Paths Mechanism is at most αk+1
k+1
k .
To prove Theorem 5.1, we need the following definition.
Definition 5.2 (Minimum Longest Path δk+1(G, c)). For any k+1 edge-disjoint s-t paths P1, . . . , Pk+1 in
a directed graph G, let δk+1(P1, . . . , Pk+1, c) denote the length of the longest s-t path w.r.t. cost vector c in
the subgraph G′ composed of P1, . . . , Pk+1 (if G′ contains a positive length cycle, set δk+1(P1, . . . , Pk+1) =
+∞). Define
δk+1(G, c) = min{δk+1(P1, . . . , Pk+1, c) | P1, . . . , Pk+1 are k + 1 edge-disjoint s-t paths}.
It turns out that we can give a lower bound on ν(c) in terms of δk+1(G, c).
Lemma 5.3. For any k-paths system on a given graph G with costs c, we have ν(c) ≥ k · δk+1(G, c).
Let L(G, c) be the length of the longest path in G∗(c), where G∗(c) is the output of our pruning
process on the bid vector c. Our second lemma gives an upper bound on the payment of our mechanism
in terms of L(G, c)
Lemma 5.4. For any k-paths system on a given graph G with costs c, the total payment of Pruning-
Lifting k-Paths Mechanism on c is at most α(G∗(c))L(G, c).
Theorem 5.1 now follows from Lemmas 5.3 and 5.4 and the observation that G∗(c) ∈ Gk+1 and
L(G, c) ≤ (k + 1)δk+1(G, c) (see Appendix B for details).
In Section 6.2, we show a lower bound of
αk+1
k on the frugality ratio of essentially any truthful k-path
mechanism; thus the frugality ratio of our mechanism is within a factor of k + 1 from optimal. This
gap leaves the question of whether there is a better truthful mechanism for k-paths systems. One might
hope that a different pruning approach could lead to a smaller frugality ratio. In particular, the proof
of Theorem 5.1 suggests that we could get a stronger result by pruning the graph so as to minimize the
length of the longest path δk+1(G
∗, c) in the surviving graph G∗. While the argument above shows that
— under truthful bidding — such mechanism would have an optimal frugality ratio, unfortunately, it
turns out that this pruning process is not monotone [22].
We can, however, show that our mechanism is optimal with respect to a weaker benchmark, namely,
one that corresponds to a buyer-pessimal rather than buyer-optimal Nash equilibrium. This benchmark
was introduced in [10], and has been recently used by Kempe et al. [23]. As argued in [10] and [23],
unlike ν, this benchmark enjoys natural monotonicity properties and is easier to work with.
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Definition 5.5 (Benchmark µ(c) [10]). Given a set system (E ,F), and a feasible set S ∈ F of minimum
total cost w.r.t. c, let µ(c) be the value of an optimal solution to the following optimization problem:
max
∑
e∈S
b(e)
s.t. (1) b(e) ≥ c(e) for all e ∈ E
(2)
∑
e∈S\T
b(e) ≤
∑
e∈T\S
c(e) for all T ∈ F
(3) For every e ∈ S there is a T ∈ F s.t. e /∈ T and
∑
e′∈S\T
b(e′) =
∑
e′∈T\S
c(e′)
We will refer to the quantity supc
p
M
(c)
µ(c) as the µ-frugality ratio of a mechanism M, where pM(c) is the
total payment of mechanism M on a bid vector c.
The programs for ν(c) and µ(c) differ in their objective function only: while ν(c) minimizes the
total payment, µ(c) maximizes it. In particular, this means that in the program for µ(c) we can omit
constraint (3), i.e., µ(c) can be obtained as a solution to a linear program. Kempe et al. [23] show
that the µ-frugality ratio of Pruning-Lifting k-Paths Mechanism is within a factor of 2(k+1) from
optimal. Our next result, combined with the observation that our lower bound on the performance of
“all” truthful mechanisms also holds for the µ-frugality ratio, shows that Pruning-Lifting k-Paths
Mechanism is, in fact, optimal with respect to µ. The proof proceeds by constructing a bid vector y
that satisfies constraints (1) and (2) in the definition of µ(c) and pays at least kL(G, c), and uses the
observation that for any fixed network the cost of a flow of size x is a convex piecewise-linear function
of x. Details of the proof are given in Appendix C.
Theorem 5.6. The µ-frugality ratio of Pruning-Lifting k-Paths Mechanism is at most
αk+1
k .
6 Lower Bounds
We say that a mechanism M for a set system (E ,F) is measurable if the payment p(e) of any agent
e ∈ E is a Lebesque measurable function of all agents’ bids. We will now use Young’s inequality to give
a lower bound on total payments of any measurable truthful mechanism with bounded frugality ratio.
Theorem 6.1 (Young’s inequality). Let f1 : [0, a] → R+ ∪ {0}, f2 : [0, b] → R+ ∪ {0} be two Lebesgue
measurable functions that are bounded on their domain. Assume that whenever y > f1(x) for some
0 < x ≤ a, 0 < y ≤ b, we have x ≤ f2(y). Then
∫ a
0
f1(x)dx+
∫ b
0
f2(y)dy ≥ ab.
Fix a set system (E ,F) with |E| = n and let S(E,F) ∈ S(E ,F) be a subset with αS = α(E,F). For any
e ∈ S(E,F), let ce,x denote a bid vector where e bids x, all agents in S(E,F) \ {e} bid 0, and all agents in
E \ S(E,F) bid n+ 1.
Lemma 6.2. For any set system (E ,F) and any measurable truthful mechanism M with bounded fru-
gality ratio, there exists an agent e ∈ S(E,F) and a real value 0 < x ≤ 1 such that the total payment of
M on bid vector ce,x is at least α(E,F)x.
9
Proof. Set S = S(E,F), H = HS, A = AS , α = αS = α(E,F). We will assume from now on that
H = (S,E(H)) is connected; if this is not the case, our argument can be applied without change to the
connected component of H that corresponds to α. Let w = (wv)v∈S be the eigenvector of A that is
associated with α. By normalization, we can assume that maxv∈S wv = 1.
The proof is by contradiction: assume that there is a truthful mechanism M that pays less than αx
on any bid vector of the form ce,x for all e ∈ S and all 0 < x ≤ 1. Recall that for any such bid vector the
cost of each agent in E \ S is n+ 1. Since α ≤ n and x ≤ 1, this implies that M never picks any agents
from E \S on any ce,x, i.e., effectively M operates on S. For any edge vu of H and any x > 0, let puv(x)
denote the payment to v on the bid vector cu,x. Observe that measurability of M implies that puv(x) is
measurable (since it is a restriction of a measurable function). In this notation, our assumption can be
restated as ∑
uv∈E(H)
puv(x) < αx (1)
for all u ∈ S and any 0 < x ≤ 1.
It is easy to see that given a bid vector cu,z with z ≤ 1, M never selects u as a winner. Indeed,
suppose that u wins given cu,z. Then by the truthfulness of M, if we reduce u’s true cost from z to 0,
u still wins and receives a payment of at least z. Since the set system restricted to S is monopoly-free,
the resulting cost vector c′ satisfies conditions (1)–(3) in the definition of ν, and hence ν(c′) = 0. Thus
the frugality ratio of M is +∞, a contradiction. By the construction of H, this means that any v ∈ S
with uv ∈ E(H) wins given cu,z.
Now, fix some x, y such that 0 < x, y ≤ 1 and y > pvu(x), and consider a situation where v bids x, u
bids y, all agents in S \ {u, v} bid 0, and all agents in E \ S bid n+ 1. Clearly, in this situation agent u
loses and thus v wins with a payment of at least x. By the truthfulness of M, the same holds if v lowers
his bid to 0. Thus, for any 0 < x, y ≤ 1, y > pvu(x) implies puv(y) ≥ x.
By our assumption, we have puv(x) ≤ αx, pvu(x) ≤ αx for x ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, for any uv ∈ E(H) the
functions puv(x) and pvu(x) satisfy all conditions of Young’s inequality on [0, 1].
Let A = (auv)u,v∈S , and consider the scalar product 〈w, Aw〉 = 〈w, αw〉 = α〈w,w〉. We have
〈w, Aw〉 = ∑uv∈E(H) wuwv. As we normalized w so that wu, wv ≤ 1, by Young’s inequality, we can
bound wuwv by
∫ wu
0 puv(x)dx+
∫ wv
0 pvu(x)dx. Therefore,
α〈w,w〉 =
∑
u,v∈S
auvwuwv ≤
∑
u,v∈S
(∫ wu
0
auvpuv(x)dx +
∫ wv
0
auvpvu(y)dy
)
= 2
∑
u∈S
∫ wu
0
∑
v∈S
auvpuv(x)dx < 2α
∑
u∈S
∫ wu
0
xdx = α
∑
u∈S
w2u = α〈w,w〉,
where the last inequality follows from (1). This is a contradiction, so the proof is complete.
6.1 Vertex Cover Systems
For vertex cover systems, deleting any of the agents would result in a monopoly. Therefore, Lemma 6.2
simply says that for any measurable truthful mechanismM on a graph G = (V,E), there exists a v ∈ V
such that the total payment on bid vector x · cv is at least αx, where α is the largest eigenvalue of the
adjacency matrix of G and cv is the cost vector given by cv(u) = 1 if u = v, and cv(u) = 0 if u ∈ V \{v}.
Given a graph G = (V,E) and a vertex v ∈ V , let Lv denote the set of all maximal cliques in G that
contain v. Let ρv denote the size of the smallest clique in Lv.
Lemma 6.3. We have ν(x · cv) ≤ x(ρv − 1) for any x > 0.
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Combining Lemma 6.3 with Lemma 6.2 yields the following result.
Theorem 6.4. For any graph G, the frugality ratio of any measurable truthful vertex cover auction on
G is at least αρ , where α is the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix of G, and ρ = maxv∈V ρv.
The bound given in Lemma 6.3 is not necessarily optimal; we can construct a family of graphs where
for some vertex v the quantity ρv is linear in the size of the graph, while ν(cv) = O(1). Nevertheless,
Theorem 6.4 shows that the mechanism described in Section 4 has optimal frugality ratio for, e.g., all
triangle-free graphs and, more generally, all graphs G such that the for each vertex v ∈ G, the subgraph
induced on the neighbors of v contains an isolated vertex.
6.2 Multiple Path Systems
Let (E ,F) be a k-path system on a graph G = (V,E). Consider a set S ∈ S(E ,F) with α
S
= α(E,F).
It is not hard to see that S is a union of k + 1 edge-disjoint paths; this follows, e.g., from the proof of
Theorem B.1. Hence, we have α(E,F) = αk+1.
As before, for any e ∈ S, let ce,x denote the cost vector with ce,x(e) = x, ce,x(u) = 0 for all u ∈ S\{e},
ce,x(w) = n + 1 for all w ∈ E \ S. It is easy to see that we have µ(ce,x) = ν(ce,x) = kx for any e ∈ S,
x > 0. Combining this observation with Lemma 6.2, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 6.5. For any graph G = (V,E), both the frugality ratio and the µ-frugality ratio of any
measurable truthful k-path auction on G are at least
αk+1
k .
In Section 5, we show that the frugality ratio and the µ-frugality ratio of Pruning-Lifting k-Paths
Mechanism are bounded by, respectively, αk+1
k+1
k and
αk+1
k . Together with Theorem 6.5 this implies
that Pruning-Lifting k-Paths Mechanism has optimal µ-frugality ratio, and its frugality ratio is
within a factor of (k + 1) from optimal.
7 Conclusions and Open Problems
In this paper, we propose a uniform scheme for designing frugal truthful mechanisms. We show that
several existing mechanisms can be viewed as instantiations of our scheme, and describe its applications
to k-path systems and vertex cover systems. We demonstrate that our scheme produces mechanisms with
good frugality ratios for k-path systems and a large subclass of vertex cover systems; for k-path systems,
we show that our mechanism has the optimal frugality ratio. Moreover, all mechanisms described in this
paper are polynomial-time computable. We believe that our scheme can be applied to many other set
systems, resulting in mechanisms with near-optimal frugality ratios.
It would be interesting to understand the limits of applicability of our scheme. Indeed, for some
set systems the minimal monopoly-free subsystem does not necessarily exhibit a lot of connections
between agents, i.e., the corresponding dependency graph is rather sparse. It seems that for such cases
our scheme does not produce mechanisms with good frugality ratio. Formalizing this intuition and
developing alternative approaches for designing frugal mechanisms in such settings is an interesting
research direction.
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A Proof of Theorem 3.1
Proof. For any agent e ∈ E and given bids of other agents, we will analyze the utility of e in terms of
his bid. There are the following two cases.
Case 1. Agent e is not dropped out in the pruning process when bidding b(e) = c(e), i.e. e ∈ E∗. By
the definition of t1(e), we know that t1(e) ≥ c(e). Consider the situation where e bids another
value b′(e) 6= b(e). If b′(e) > t1(e), then e /∈ E∗ and his utility is 0. If b′(e) ≤ t1(e), by the
bid-independence property, we know that the subset E∗ remains the same. Given this fact, the
structure of the graph H does not change, which implies that the eigenvectors and eigenvalues of
its adjacency matrix do not change either. Hence, the threshold value t2(e) will not change, which
implies that the payment to agent e, p(e) = min{t1(e), t2(e)}, will not change.
Case 2. Agent e is dropped out in the pruning process when bidding b(e) = c(e), i.e. e /∈ E∗. Consider
the situation where e bids another value b′(e) 6= b(e) and is not dropped out. By monotonicity
and bid-independence, we know that b′(e) ≤ t1(e) ≤ b(e) = c(e). Hence, even though e could be a
winner by bidding b′(e), his payment is at most t1(e) ≤ c(e), which implies that he cannot obtain
a positive utility.
From the above two cases, we know that the utility of each agent is maximized by bidding his true cost,
and hence the mechanism is truthful.
B Analysis of Pruning-Lifting k-Paths Mechanism
B.1 Lower Bound on ν
Our analysis of Pruning-Lifting k-Paths Mechanism relies on the characterization of Nash flows
presented in [17].
Theorem B.1 ([17]). Let G = (V,E) be a directed graph with weight w(e) on each edge e ∈ E. Given
two specific vertices s, t ∈ V , assume that there are k edge-disjoint paths from s to t. Let P1, P2, · · · , Pk
be such k edge-disjoint s-t paths so that its total weight L ,
∑k
i=1w(Pi) is minimized, where w(Pi) =∑
e∈Pi w(e). Further, it is known that for every edge e ∈ E, the graph G − {e} has k edge-disjoint s-t
paths with the same total weight L. Then essentially there exist k + 1 edge-disjoint s-t paths in G such
that each of them is a shortest path from s to t.
We will first show how Theorem B.1 implies Lemma 5.3. For completeness, we will then present a
proof of Theorem B.1; this proof also appears in [17].
Proof of Lemma 5.3. Fix a cost vector c. Let E′ be the winning set with respect to c, and consider a
bid vector b that satisfies conditions (1)–(3) in the definition of ν(c). Let p(b) denote the total payment
under b. The set E′ contains k edge-disjoint s-t paths. By condition (2), no agent in E′ can obtain
more revenue by increasing his bid. That is, for any e ∈ E′, there are k edge-disjoint s-t paths in G\{e}
with the same total bid as E′. Applying Theorem B.1 with w(e) = b(e), we obtain that there are k + 1
edge-disjoint shortest s-t paths with length p(b)k each w.r.t b. Consider the subgraph G
′ composed by
these k + 1 edge-disjoint paths. We know that δk+1(G
′, c) ≤ p(b)k as b(e) ≥ c(e) for any edge e, i.e. the
longest s-t path in G′ w.r.t to c is at most p(b)k . Hence,
p(b) ≥ k · δk+1(G′, c) ≥ k · δk+1(G, c).
As this holds for any vector b that satisfies conditions (1)–(3), it follows that ν(c) ≥ δk+1(G, c).
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In the rest of this section, we prove Theorem B.1.
Proof of Theorem B.1. Given the graph G and integer k, we construct a flow network Nk(G) as follows:
We introduce two extra nodes s0 and t0 and two edges s0s and tt0. The set of vertices of Nk(G) is
V ∪ {s0, t0} and the set of edges is E ∪ {s0s, tt0}. The capacity cap(·) and cost per bulk capacity cost(·)
for each edge in Nk(G) is defined as follows:
• cap(s0s) = cap(tt0) = k and cost(s0s) = cost(tt0) = 0.
• cap(e) = 1 and cost(e) = w(e), for e ∈ E.
Given the above construction, every path from s to t in G naturally corresponds to a bulk flow from
s0 to t0 in Nk(G). Hence, the set of k edge-disjoint paths P1, P2, . . . , Pk in G corresponds to a flow FG of
size k in Nk(G). In addition, the minimality of L =
∑k
i=1w(Pi) implies that FG achieves the minimum
cost (which is L) for all integer -valued flows of size k, i.e. maximum flow in Nk(G). Since all capacities
of Nk(G) are integers, we can conclude that FG has the minimum cost among all real maximum flows
in Nk(G). (The proof of this fact can be found in, e.g., [16].)
For simplicity, we denote the subgraph G−{e} by G−e. By the fact that for any e ∈ E, the subgraph
G−e has k edge-disjoint s-t paths with the same total weight L, we know that in the network Nk(G−e),
there still is an integer-valued flow FG−e of size k and cost L. So FG−e is also an integer-valued flow of
size k and cost L in Nk(G). Define a real-valued flow in Nk(G) by F = 1|E|
∑
e∈E FG−e. We have the
following observations:
1. It is clear that F(e) ≤ cap(e) for every arc e ∈ Nk(G), where F(e) is the amount of flow on edge
e in F , as we have taken the arithmetic average of the flows in the network.
2. F has cost 1|E|
∑
e∈E
cost(FG−e) = 1|E| · |E| · L = L.
3. Since FG−e(s0s) = k for any e ∈ E, we have F(s0s) = k. In addition, as each FG−e is a feasible
flow that satisfies all conservation conditions and F is defined by the arithmetic average of all
FG−e’s, we know that F also satisfies all conservation conditions.
Therefore, F is a minimum cost maximum flow in Nk(G). In addition, F has the following nice property,
which plays a fundamental role for the proof:
• For every edge e ∈ Nk(G) except s0s and tt0, we have F(e) ≤ cap(e)− 1|E| , as FG−e does not flow
through e, i.e. FG−e(e) = 0, and FG−e′(e) is either 0 or 1 for any e′ ∈ E.
Let E+ = {e ∈ Nk(G) | F(e) > 0}. Suppose that there is a path P ′ = (e1, e2, . . . , er) from s0 to t0
which goes only along arcs in E+ and is not a shortest path w.r.t cost(·) from s0 to t0 in Nk(G). Let
ǫ = min
{
F(e1),F(e2), . . . ,F(er), 1|E|
}
. Since P ′ ⊆ E+, we have ǫ > 0. Let P be a shortest path w.r.t
cost(·) from s0 to t0 in Nk(G). Define a new flow F ′ from F by adding ǫ amount of flow on path P and
removing ǫ amount of flow from path P ′. We have the following observations about F ′:
1. The size of flow F ′ is k.
2. F ′ satisfies all conservation conditions as it is a linear combination of three flows from s0 to t0.
3. By the definition of ǫ, the amount of flow of each edge is non-negative in F ′. Further, F ′ satisfies
the capacity constrains. This follows from the facts that ǫ ≤ 1|E| and the above property established
for F .
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4. The cost of F ′ is smaller than L because cost(F ′) = cost(F) − ǫ(cost(P ′) − cost(P )), which is
smaller than L = cost(F) as cost(P ) < cost(P ′) by the assumption.
Hence, F ′ is a flow of size k in Nk(G) with cost smaller than F , a contradiction. Thus, every path from
s0 to t0 in Nk(G) along the edges in E+ is a shortest path w.r.t cost(·).
Consider a new network N ′k+1(G) obtained from Nk+1(G) by restricting edges in E+. (Note that
the only difference between Nk+1(G) and Nk(G) is the capacity on edges s0s and tt0 is k+1 rather than
k.) We claim that in this network there is an integer-valued flow of size k + 1. Suppose otherwise, by
Ford-Fulkerson Theorem [13], there is a cut (Ss0 , Tt0) in N ′k+1(G) with size less than or equal to k. By
definition, in N ′k+1(G) we have cap(s0s) = k+1 and cap(tt0) = k+1, which implies that s0, s ∈ Ss0 and
t0, t ∈ Tt0 . By the definition of E+, we know that the total amount of flows of F on the cut (Ss0 , Tt0) is
k. Since F(e) < 1 for any edge e, we can conclude that there are at least k + 1 edges from Ss0 to Tt0 in
E+. This leads to a contradiction, because we have showed that the size of the cut (Ss0 , Tt0) is less than
or equal to k.
Therefore, we can find an integer-valued flow of size k + 1 on edges in E+ in the network Nk+1(G).
Such a flow can be thought as the union of k + 1 edge-disjoint paths from s0 to t0. We know that every
such path going along edges in E+ is a shortest path from s0 to t0. This in turn concludes the proof,
since we have found k + 1 edge-disjoint shortest paths from s to t in G.
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Figure 1: An instance of 1-path problem on which Pruning-Lifting k-Paths Mechanism does not
choose the path that minimizes δ2(G, c)
B.2 Upper Bound on the Payment of Pruning-Lifting k-Paths Mechanism
In this subsection, we will prove Lemma 5.4. Fix a cost vector c and set G∗ = G∗(c), H = H(G∗(c)),
α = α(G∗(c)). Observe that since G∗ is the cheapest collection of k edge-disjoint paths in G∗, it is
necessarily cycle-free. We say that a vertex v is an articulation point for G∗ if it lies on any s-t path in
G. Suppose that G∗ has a+1 articulation points s = v1, v2, . . . , va+1 = t that subdivide G∗ into a parts
G∗1, . . . , G
∗
a. Denote by Hj the induced subgraph of H with vertex set {ve | e ∈ G∗j}, j = 1, . . . , a. For
any graph Γ, let V (Γ) and E(Γ) denote the sets of vertices and edges of Γ, respectively. The following
intermediate lemma describes the structure of the graph H.
Lemma B.2. Graph H is connected if and only if G∗ has no articulation points. Hence, for each j, Hj
is connected.
For each vertex v ∈ V (H), let ev be the corresponding edge in G∗. Before we prove Lemma B.2, we
need the following two observations.
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Figure 2: An example of the construction of H from G∗ for k = 2
Claim B.3. Let u and v be two vertices of H, then uv /∈ E(H) if and only if there is an s-t path in G∗
going through both eu and ev.
Proof. If there is a path P ⊆ G∗ such that eu, ev ∈ P , then in G∗ \ {eu, ev} there are k edge-disjoint
s-t paths. Hence there is no edge between u and v. Conversely, if uv /∈ E(H), then G∗ \ {eu, ev} has
k edge-disjoint s-t paths. Removing these k paths from G∗ leads to an s-t path going through eu and
ev.
Claim B.4. Let P be an s-t path in G∗, corresponding to the vertex sequence v1, . . . , vℓ of H, and let v
be another vertex of H. Then the following holds:
1. There are integral i and j, 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ ℓ, such that vvr ∈ E(H) for i ≤ r ≤ j, and vvr /∈ E(H) for
1 ≤ r < i and j < r ≤ ℓ.
2. Let L(v) = {vr | 1 ≤ r ≤ ℓ, vvr /∈ E(H)}, then in G∗ there is a s-t path containing all vertices of
L(v) and v.
Proof.
1. Since G∗ \ {ev} contains only k edge-disjoint s-t paths, there is a cut of size k+1 in G∗ containing
ev and this cut must contain an edge of P . Thus, there exists a vertex vi with 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ adjacent
to v in H. For the first part of the claim, it remains to show that if v is adjacent to vp and vq with
p < q, then so is vr for any r with p ≤ r ≤ q. Suppose otherwise, then by Claim B.3 there should
be a path P ′ going through ev and evr for some p < r < q. If P ′ goes through ev earlier than evr ,
we can construct a path in G∗ going through both ev and evq . Indeed, we can concatenate the
prefix of P ′ that ends with evp and the suffix of P that starts with evp ; this path is simple since G∗
is cycle-free. By a similar argument, if P ′ goes through evr earlier than ev, then we can construct
a path in G∗ gong through evp and ev. For both cases we arrive at a contradiction with Claim B.3,
since vp and vq are adjacent to v in H.
2. This part can be derived from the first part and Claim B.3 applied to two pairs of vertices vi−1, v
and vj+1, v.
We are now ready to prove Lemma B.2.
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Proof of Lemma B.2. Suppose that G∗ contains an articulation point v ∈ V (G∗). Then we can split G∗
into the union of two subgraphs G1 (from s to v) and G2 (from v to t). By the definition of H, it can
be seen that for any e1 ∈ E(G1) and e2 ∈ E(G2), ve1ve2 /∈ E(H). Hence, if H is connected, then G∗ has
no articulation points.
On the other hand, suppose that G∗ has no articulation points. We can endow the set of nodes of G∗
with a partial order by putting u > v if there is a path in G∗ from u to v. Suppose that H is disconnected.
Let C be a connected component of H. Let S(C) be the set of endpoints of the edges in G∗ corresponding
to those vertices in C. We claim that S(C) has a unique smallest element, denoted by ρ(C). Suppose
otherwise that S(C) has at least two different smallest elements v1 and v2 with e1 = u1v1 ∈ E(G∗) and
e2 = u2v2 ∈ E(G∗). Assume without loss of generality that v1 6= t. Then there is v3 ∈ V (G∗) such that
e3 = v1v3 ∈ E(G∗). There could not be a path going through both e2 and e3, since in this case either
v2 > v1 or v1 > v2. Hence e2 and e3 are adjacent in H, which implies that e3 ∈ C. But then we have
v3 ∈ S(C) and v3 < v1, a contradiction to the assumption that v1 is a smallest element.
Since e1 = uv ∈ E(G∗) and e2 = wv ∈ E(G∗) are necessarily adjacent in H, two different connected
components C1 and C2 of H cannot have the same smallest element, i.e. ρ(C1) 6= ρ(C2). Let us take
the component C with the smallest element ρ(C) 6= t. It is also clear by the definition of ρ(C) that
ρ(C) 6= s. Let e be a vertex of C with the ending point at ρ(C) in G∗. We want to show that ρ(C) is
an articulation point for G∗. Suppose otherwise that there is a path P in G∗ which does not go through
ρ(C). Let ve ∈ H correspond to e and v1, . . . , vℓ ∈ H correspond to P . Applying Claim B.4 to P and
ve, we get that vj is adjacent to ve in H and there is a path from endpoint of ve in G∗, i.e. ρ(C), to
the endpoint of vj. Thus we arrive at a contradiction, since vj ∈ C and endpoint of vj is smaller than
ρ(C).
We will now prove Lemma 5.4.
Proof of Lemma 5.4. Suppose first that G∗ has no articulation points. Let P ∗ be a losing path in G∗
according to the mechanism. Then P ∗ is the most expensive path in G∗ w.r.t. scaled cost vector. Assume
that P ∗ is represented as a sequence of vertices v1, v2, . . . , vℓ in H and let v be another vertex of H. Let
i(v) and j(v) be the two integers, 1 ≤ i(v) ≤ j(v) ≤ ℓ, as defined in Claim B.4. Note that the threshold
bid of v is at most
∑j(v)
r=i(v)
c(vr)
w(vr)
w(v), since otherwise by Claim B.4, one can find a more expensive path
(w.r.t. scaled costs) going through L(v) and v than P ∗. Thus we have the following upper bound on the
total payment of the mechanism:
∑
v/∈P ∗
j(v)∑
r=i(v)
c(vr)
w(vr)
w(v) =
ℓ∑
r=1
∑
v∈NH(vr)
c(vr)
w(vr)
w(v)
=
ℓ∑
r=1
c(vr)
w(vr)
∑
v∈NH(vr)
w(v)
=
ℓ∑
r=1
c(vr)
w(vr)
α(G∗)w(vr)
= α(G∗)
ℓ∑
t=1
c(vt).
As L(G, c) ≥
ℓ∑
t=1
c(vt), this proves the lemma for this case.
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For the general case where there are articulation points in G∗, by using the same analysis on each con-
nected component Hi of H, we can upper-bound the total payment of our mechanism by
∑
Hi
αi
ℓi∑
r=1
c(vi,r),
where vi,1, vi,2, . . . , vi,ℓi are a sequence of vertices in each Hi corresponding to the most expensive path
P ∗, and αi is the maximum eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix of Hi. As α(G∗) = maxi αi, and the
most expensive path in G∗ is a concatenation of the most expensive paths in G∗1, . . . , G
∗
a, the lemma is
proven.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 5.1
We will now show how Lemmas 5.3 and 5.4 imply Theorem 5.1.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Fix an arbitrary cost vector c. Suppose that in the pruning stage we pick a graph
G∗. By Lemma 5.4, the total payment of our mechanism is at most α(G∗)L(G, c). Since G∗ ∈ Gk+1,
we have α(G∗) ≤ αk+1. Consider a collection P1, . . . , Pk+1 of k + 1 edge-disjoint paths in G such that
δk+1(P1, . . . , Pk+1, c) = δk+1(G, c). Since G
∗ is the cheapest collection of k+1 edge-disjoint paths in G,
we have
∑
e∈G∗ c(e) ≤
∑k+1
i=1
∑
e∈Pi c(e). We obtain
L(G, c) ≤
∑
e∈G∗
c(e) ≤
k+1∑
i=1
∑
e∈Pi
c(e) ≤ (k + 1)δk+1(P1, . . . , Pk+1, c) = (k + 1)δk+1(G, c),
where the last inequality follows from the definition of δk+1(P1, . . . , Pk+1, c). Thus, the frugality ratio of
Pruning-Lifting k-Paths Mechanism on c is at most
α(G∗)L(G, c)
kδk+1(G, c)
≤ αk+1(k + 1)δk+1(G, c)
kδk+1(G, c)
=
αk+1(k + 1)
k
.
C µ-Frugality Analysis: Proof of Theorem 5.6
To prove Theorem 5.6, we need to show that we can lower-bound µ(c) in terms of L(G, c).
Consider an arbitrary network F with source s, sink t, integer edge capacities and costs per unit flow
that are given by a vector c. Let M be the size of the maximum flow in F . For any (real) x ∈ [0,M ],
let C(x) be the cost of a cheapest flow of size x in F (i.e. the sum of costs on all edges, where the cost
on an edge e is the amount of flow times c(e)). The following lemma establishes several properties of
the function C(x) that will be used in our proof.
Lemma C.1.
1. C(x) is a convex function on [0,M ].
2. For any integer i ≤M − 1, C(x) is a linear function on the interval [i, i+ 1].
Proof.
• Convexity. It suffices to show that for any 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 we have
αC(x) + (1− α)C(y) ≥ C(αx+ (1− α)y).
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Let fx and fy be cheapest flows of size x and y, respectively. Clearly, their respective costs are
C(x) and C(y). Then the flow f = αfx + (1 − α)fy is a flow of size (αx + (1 − α)y) and cost
αC(x) + (1− α)C(y) that satisfies all capacity constraints. Thus,
αC(x) + (1− α)C(y) = c(f) ≥ C(αx+ (1− α)y).
• Linearity on intervals. We first show that C(x) is linear on the interval [0, 1]. Let us fix
x0 ∈ [0, 1] and let f be a cheapest flow of size x0. We can represent f as a finite sum of positive
flows along s-t paths p1, . . . , pl, i.e.,
f =
l∑
i=1
εipi.
We know that C(1) is the cost of cheapest path p. Thus we have
C(x0) = c(f) ≥ c(p)
l∑
i=1
εi = C(1)x0.
On the other hand, since C(x) is convex, we have x0C(1) + (1− x0)C(0) ≥ C(x0). Hence C(x0) =
x0C(1).
In general, for the interval [i, i + 1] we first take a cheapest i-flow fi (which we can choose to be
integer) and consider the residual network Fi = F − fi. We can then apply the argument for the
[0, 1] case to Fi.
Our next lemma bounds µ(c) in terms of the difference between the cost of the cheapest flow of size
k and that of the cheapest flow of size k + 1.
Lemma C.2. Let (E ,F) be a k-path system given by a directed graph G = (V,E), source s and sink t,
and let c be its cost vector. Then for the function C(x) defined above we have k ·(C(k+1)−C(k)) ≤ µ(c).
Proof. For any cost vector y ∈ R|E|, let Cy(x) denote the cost of the cheapest flow of size x in G with
respect to the cost vector y; we have Cc(x) = C(x).
Let fk be a cheapest flow of size k, and let fk+1 be a cheapest flow of size k + 1, both with respect
to cost vector c. Let nk denote the number of edges in fk. Assume without loss of generality that the
edges in fk are labeled as e1, . . . , enk .
We will now gradually increase the costs of edges in fk so that the resulting cost vector y satisfies
certain conditions. Specifically, we start with y = c. Then, at i-th step, i = 1, . . . , nk, we increase y(ei)
as much as possible subject to the following constraints:
(a) y(fk) =
∑
e∈fk y(e) = Cy(k), i.e., fk must remain the cheapest k-flow w.r.t. cost vector y.
(b) Cy(k + 1)− Cy(k) = C(k + 1)− C(k), i.e. Cy(k + 1)− Cy(k) does not change.
Since our k-path system is monopoly-free, in the end, all entries of y are finite. Further, it is not hard
to see that when the process is over, we cannot increase the cost of any edge in fk without violating (a)
or (b).
Now, for each edge e ∈ fk, we will define the tight flow f(e) as below to be a flow that prevented
us from raising y(e) beyond its current value. Specifically, consider each edge ei ∈ fk. Suppose first
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that when we were raising y(ei), we had to stop because constraint (a) became tight. In this case, let
f(ei) be some cheapest flow of size k in G \ {ei} with respect to the costs y at the end of stage i. Now,
suppose that when we were raising y(ei), constraint (b) became tight first. In this case, let f(ei) be some
cheapest flow of size k + 1 in G \ {ei} with respect to the costs y at the end of stage i. Observe that
fk remains a cheapest k-flow throughout the process; further, for all e ∈ fk, the flow f(e) is a cheapest
flow of its size in G with respect to the final cost vector as well. In the following we consider the cost
vector y at the end of the process.
x
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Figure 3: The graph of Cy(x)
Let f∗ be the average of all tight flows, i.e., set
f∗ =
1
nk
∑
e∈fk
f(e).
Let q be the size of f∗; we have k ≤ q ≤ k + 1. Note that f∗ is a cheapest flow of size q by the second
statement of lemma C.1, as it is a convex combination of cheapest flows of size k and cheapest flows of
size k+1. Further, since e /∈ f(e) for any e ∈ fk, the amount of flow that passes through each edge e in
f∗ is strictly less than 1. Thus, for a sufficiently small ǫ > 0, flow f∗ + ǫfk is a valid flow of size q + ǫk
in G. Moreover, we have Cy(q + εk) ≤ y(f∗ + ǫfk) = Cy(q) + εCy(k).
This observation, together with the convexity of Cy(x), allows us to derive that Cy(x) is a linear
function on the interval [0, k + 1]. Indeed, by convexity of Cy(x) we have
Cy(k) ≤ q+(ε−1)kq+εk Cy(0) + kq+εkCy(q + εk) =
k
q + εk
Cy(q + εk)
Cy(q) ≤ εkq+εkCy(0) + qq+εkCy(q + εk) =
q
q + εk
Cy(q + εk)
If any of the two inequalities above is an equality, then Cy(x) is linear on [0, k + 1] and we are done.
Otherwise, both of these inequalities are strict, and we can write
Cy(q + εk) ≤ Cy(q) + εCy(k) < q
q + εk
Cy(q + εk) + ε
k
q + εk
Cy(q + εk) = Cy(q + εk).
The contradiction shows that Cy(x) is a linear function on [0, k + 1].
Since y satisfies conditions (1) and (2) in the definition of µ(c), we obtain
µ(c) ≥ Cy(k) = k(Cy(k + 1)− Cy(k)) = k(Cc(k + 1)− Cc(k)),
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where the first equality follows from linearity of Cy(x) and last equality holds by construction of y.
Thus, the lemma is proven.
Recall now that L(G, c) by definition is the longest path in G∗(c), where G∗ = G∗(c) is the cheapest
k + 1-flow w.r.t. c. Hence, C(k + 1) = c(G∗). Further we can decompose G∗ into the sum of a path
with the cost L(G, c) and some k-flow, which implies that C(k + 1) ≥ L(G, c) + C(k). Rewriting the
last inequality we get C(k+1)−C(k) ≥ L(G, c). Combining this observation with Lemma 5.4 we easily
derive Theorem 5.6.
D Proof of Lemma 6.3
Let Cv be some clique of size ρv in CLv, and consider the bid vector b given by b(u) = x if u ∈ Cv and
b(u) = 0 if u ∈ V \ Cv. Since Cv is a clique, any vertex cover for G must contain at least ρv − 1 vertices
of Cv. Thus, any cheapest feasible set with respect to the true costs contains all vertices in Cv \ {v}; let
S denote some such set. Moreover, for any u ∈ Cv \ {v}, any vertex cover that does not contain u must
contain v, so b satisfies condition (2) with respect to the set S in the definition of the benchmark ν. To
see that is also satisfies condition (3), note that if any vertex in Cv \ {v} decides to raise its bid, it can
be replaced by its neighbors at cost x. Now, consider any w ∈ (V \ Cv) ∩ S. The vertex w cannot be
adjacent to all vertices in Cv, since otherwise Cv would not be a maximal clique. Thus, if w ∈ S, we can
obtain a vertex cover of cost x(ρv − 1) that does not include w by taking all vertices of cost 0 as well as
all vertices in Cv that are adjacent to w.
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